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Re Leeming1: Is A Statutory Provision For 
Adjudication a Substantive or Procedural Right?
CASE SUMMARY
Mary Leeming was employed as a Secretary I at the District #20 
School Board Office by the New Brunswick Department of Education. 
W ithout warning she was discharged. As a probationary employee under 
the Collective Agreement, Mrs. Leeming was specifically excluded from 
recourse to the grievance procedure. She lodged a grievance under 
Section 91(1) o f the Public Service Labour Relations Act which provides for 
a grievance process where no administrative procedure for redress is 
provided. The adjudicator found her dismissal was a disciplinary action. 
He held the collective agreement could not remove the grievor’s statutory 
right to take the discharge to arbitration and ordered the grievor rein­
stated. On appeal, the New Brunswick Court o f Appeal affirmed the 
adjudicator’s decision that the grievor was wrongly dismissed but allowed 
in part that the adjudicator had exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering 
her reinstatem ent. On appeal, the Suprem e C ourt o f Canada held, 
reversing New Brunswick Court of Appeal, that the Public Service Labour 
Relations Act does not confer substantive rights upon employees in addi­
tion to their rights as defined in the collective agreement.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Public Service employees were accorded the statutory right to take a 
grievance to adjudication in the Public Service Labour Act. From its incep­
tion in 1968, the Act included the provision in section 91 which entitled 
the employee to grieve a matter in dispute and in section 92 to refer an 
unsatisfactory resolution of the matter to adjudication. Sections 91(b) and 
92(1 )(b) read as follows:
91(l)(b) Where any em ployee feels himself to be aggrieved
(b) as a result o f  any occurrence or matter affecting his terms and 
conditions o f employment, other than a provision described in subclause 
(i) or (ii) o f  clause (a),
in respect o f  which no administrative procedure for redress is provided in or 
under an Act o f  the Legislative Assembly, he is entitled, subject to subsection 
(2), to prevent the grievance at each o f  the levels, up to and including the 
final level, in the grievance process provided for by this Act.
'Re Leemmg (1981), 118 D.L.R. (3d) 202, (S.C.C.)
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92(1 )(b) Where an employee has presented a grievance up to and including 
the final level in the grievance process with respect to
(b) disciplinary action resulting in discharge, suspension or a financial 
penalty,
and his grievance has not been dealt with to his satisfaction, he may, subject 
to subsection (2), refer the grievance to adjudication.1
The right of an aggrieved employee to be adjudicated by a third 
party implies a basic right, the substantive right to have a hearing. Some 
collective agreements, however, have singled out probationary employees 
for separate treatment. It has not been unusual for unions to bargain 
away a probationary employee’s right to a hearing in the event of a 
dismissal. The following clause in the collective agreement was at odds 
with the statutory provision in s. 91:
22.01(e) A “probationary” em ployee may be employed either full-time or part- 
time. Newly hired employees shall be considered on a probationary basis for 
a period o f  one hundred (100) working days. During the probationary period, 
employees shall be entitled to all rights and privileges o f  the Agreement, 
except with respect to discharge. The employment o f such employees may be 
terminated at any time during the probationary period without recourse to the 
Grievance Procedure.3
At issue was whether the provision in the collective agreement could 
stand, given the provision in the labour legislation. Cases in the early 
Seventies favored the management position. The probationary period 
was merely an extension of the hiring process, an on-the-job assessment, 
which resulted in acceptance or non-acceptance. Non-acceptance con­
cluded the assessment and was not to be seen as a discharge.4 Employers 
argued that a job interview often did not give them the appropriate 
information to make a proper decision. Only efforts put forth within the 
work environment could afford the necessary basis from which to judge.
Trutschler C.J. expressed a similar position in Pioneer Electric M ani­
toba Ltd. :
A probationary employee can have many grievances requiring resolution but 
that is not to say that he may grieve against the decision o f  management not 
to admit him to the status o f  a permanent employee. It would require very 
plain words to thus negate the whole concept o f  probation.5
*LolUctxi* Agreement between the New Brunswick Treasury Board and CUPE, New Brunswick Council of School
Board Employees. Article 22.01 (e).
*Forest Industrial Relations and the International Woodworkers of America (unreported) a B.C. Arbitration
award of then Chief Justice Sloan.
5Pioneer Electric Manitoba Ltd., [1971] CLLC 14,071 (Man. QB) at 316.
»R.S.N.B 1973, c. P-25
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Tritschler CJQB (as he then was) made the statement following dismissal 
of a probationary employee under an article in the collective agreement 
which provided for a 70 day probationary period before a newly-hired 
employee was put on the seniority list.6 The decision defends the right 
of management to make such recommendations regarding the denial of 
seniority and the decision defines such management functions as being 
beyond the prerogative of the Labor Relations Board.
The Labor Relations Board of British Columbia examined a similar 
clause in the Collective Agreement under consideration in Cassiar Asbestos7:
T he Company may at any time during his period o f probation terminate the 
employment o f a probationary employee. Such employee shall have the right 
to grieve in respect o f  any matter other than his discharge or seniority.8
The issue was whether such a provision could stand given Section 
93 in the Labour Code providing for resolution of all disputes by 
arbitration. After discussing the “right to manage” position from Forest 
Industrial Relations and Pioneer Electric, the Board viewed the conflict from 
the employee’s position. The very origin of the arbitration provision in 
the statute was the result of an attempt to provide “a satisfactory alter­
native to direct job action by employees.”9 Wnile termination without just 
cause during probation may be a management prerogative, the practical 
side of the issue is that employees will indeed react to what they perceive 
as unjust treatment.
“There is no single greater cause o f  wildcat strikes than group reaction to 
what is believed, righdy or wrongly, to be the unfair dismissal or discipline o f 
a fellow em ployee . . . Whatever be the proper legal characterization, the prac­
tical reality is that some employees react very differendy to the loss o f a job  
by som eone who may have worked alongside them for a month or two than 
they would to the refusal to hire an applicant in the personnel office.10
The Cassiar case determ ined that the issue was not freedom  to 
contract, but the fact that “the legislature deliberately withheld that kind 
of freedom from the parties.”11 Freedom to contract here is used in the 
context of stipulating that a probationary employee does not have the 
right to grieve dismissal. It is for reasons of public policy stated below 
that this case suggests the legislation should prevail. Freedom to contract 
away the right to adjudication is denied because the adjudication is seen
•Ibid., p. 315.
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as the screening process through which abuse might be detected. It is 
quite possible that a probationary employee could be dropped for reasons 
o ther than a hiring assessment. An employer could be motivated by 
discrimination, by incomplete information, o r by a desire to punish. 
T here are all elements lying outside the purpose of the probationary 
provision. “The effect of a ban on arbitrability, such as is contained in 
the Collective Agreement, is to put a blanket immunity around errors or 
abuses of the latter kind.”12
The B.C. Board said the statute prohibited the parties in violation 
thereof from ensuring that the grievances of probationary employees did 
not see the light o f day. The statute only stipulates that the grievor 
appear before an arbitrator.
. . . O u r  interpretation o f  s.93(l)(b) is that once the parties inserted such 
provisions into their agreement, they were then required to allow disputes 
about their operation to be dealt with under the arbitration procedure which 
was adopted under this agreement as the method for setting disputes without 
stoppage o f  work.
That conclusion still leaves it up to the parties to turn their minds to 
defining the specific standards which they wish the arbitrator to apply to 
disputes.13
Exacdy what is intended by the parties who are defining the specific 
standards is unclear. It seems it would enable an adjudicator to hear the 
circumstances of the dispute and from that decide whether the guidelines 
in the collective agreement extended him jurisdiction. The adjudicator is 
in a position to filter out arbitrary abuses which were not intended to be 
protected by the collective agreement.
Jacmain v. A.G. (Canada) et al was argued by the respondents before the 
Supreme Court of Canada. While the issue direcdy raised is not the right 
to grieve, the jurisdiction of the adjudicator vis a vis the probationer is 
addressed. Pigeon J. held the adjudicator in Jacmain had the jurisdiction 
to determine whether the dismissal was a disciplinary action or whether 
it was merely term ination at the probationary stage. In the form er 
instance the adjudicator could proceed to hear the merits o f the case, in 
the latter instance he could not retain jurisdiction. Jacmain reinforces the 
right to appear before an adjudicator and defines the circumstances 
under which he can act.
Re Paasche, when argued before the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, 
discussed two articles in the collective agreement. Article 17 containing
"Ibid., p. 218.
,slbtd.
l*Jacmmn v. A.G. (Canada) ft al., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 15 at 41-42.
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the grievance procedure had been denied to probationary employees. 
This position was reversed by the Court o f Appeal subject to Article 5.02 
which created an exception for grievances for dismissal or suspension. 
Limerick J. A. indicates that “the purpose of the exception was merely 
to affirm the employer’s right to terminate the employment o f a proba­
tionary employee without just cause where the employer is of the opinion 
that the employee’s performance is, or may later prove to be, unsatisfac­
tory.”15 He points out that the wording in the collective agreement goes 
beyond this and denies grievance and adjudication procedures “in case 
o f suspension or dismissal”.18 Given this circumstance the employee has 
recourse through the grievance procedure in the Act. While the Queen s 
Bench Division held tnat the collective agreement could not remove the 
substantive right of the employee to grieve, the Court o f Appeal allowed 
the appeal and held the chairman of the Public Service Labor Relations 
Board could not expand upon provisions made in the collective agree­
ment.
In April of 1980 the Ontario High Court analyzed two provisions of 
a collective agreement in Toronto Hydro. 17 One article in the collective 
agreement provided for grievance procedures and stipulated that no 
employee be dismissed without just cause. A separate article denied the 
grievance procedure in respect of dismissal to probationary employees. 
The court dubbed the form er provision as a “substantive right” and the 
latter as “procedural.” They found the article denying the grievance 
procedure was at odds with both the substantive right and with a statutory 
provision that all differences arising from the collective agreement are 
subject to arbitration and they declared it void. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal affirmed the decision18 just before the Supreme Court of Canada 
handed down the decision in Re Leeming.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE
The Supreme Court of Canada after hearing Re Leeming, held Sec­
tions 91 and 92 of the Act did not confer substantive rights upon 
employees in addition to their rights as defined in the collective agree­
ment. The greater part of the decision is devoted to recounting the case 
at the lower court level. There are three significant statements of Mart- 
land J. which lend themselves to thoughtful interpretation.
l1Re Toronto Hydro-Electric System and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 1, (1981), 29 OR (2d)
18 (Ont. High Ct.).
xtRe Toronto Hydro-Electric System and Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local I, (1981), 20 OR (2d) 
64 Ont. C.A.
'•Re Paasche (1979), 26 NBR (2d) 199 at 208 (NBCA).
'•Ibid
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. . .  it is my opinion that the em ployer was entitled to terminate the respond­
ent’s em ploym ent without cause. At the time o f  the term ination o f  her 
employment, the respondent was a probationary employee. T he requirement 
contained in 10.01 for the employer to show just cause for the suspension or 
discharge o f  an em ployee applied only to an employee who had completed 
his probationary period.1*
This is not a difficult position to accept since there is no statutory 
provision requiring dismissal be only for just cause. Hence, such a pro­
vision in a collective agreement is not at odds with public policy. The 
reasons an employer should be able to dismiss a probationary employee 
at will are mentioned above.20 The legislature has not seen fit to deny 
that freedom by stipulating dismissal must only be for just cause.
After distinguishing and dismissing Re Paasche, Martland J. discusses 
Sec. 65 o f the Public Service Labour Relations Act which provides that “a 
collective agreement is subject to and for the purpose of this act binding 
upon employees in the bargaining unit. The respondent was therefore 
bound by the Provisions of Articles 10.01 and 22.01 (e) unless there can 
be found in the Act some provision which dismissed their impact on 
her.”21 The court has stipulated this right is contained in the Collective 
Agreement. As a right for probationary employees, unions may chose to 
defend it or bargain it away.
Martland J. does not define a substantive right in the context in 
which he uses it. Neither does he define a procedural right. This failure 
to amplify the meanings of these key words, leaves them open to iter- 
pretation.
A distinction is made between them in Blacks Dictionary under the 
definition of Procedural law:
As a general rule, laws which fix duties, establish rights and responsibilities 
am ong and for persons, natural or otherwise, are ‘substantive laws’ in char­
acter, while those which merely prescribe the manner in which such rights 
and responsibilities may be exercised and enforced in court are ‘procedural 
laws.’21
And so it may be argued that the right to grieve is procedural but 
the right to relate the merits o f the case is substantive or perhaps it is 
the converse. It can be argued that both aspects are substantive. It may 
even be suggested that the right to appear before an adjudicator is both
"T h ese  reasons are put forth in both Forest Industrial Relations and Pioneer Electric supra.
"Black, Henry Campbell, Black’s Law Dictwnary 5th Edition, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1979, 
1083.
1*Supra, footnote 1, at 205.
*'Supra, footnote 1, at 206.
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procedural and substantive. The debate over semantics has perhaps 
clouded the issue as was expressed by Reid, J. in his dissenting judgem ent 
in Toronto Hydro:
. . .  I do  not find it edifying to label one provision in  an agreem ent as 
conferring a “substantive right" and labelling another as “procedural." If that 
device is to be used it is equally appropriate to reverse the labels, or to label 
both articles as procedural or both in terms o f  rights. What is to prevent one 
from saying that both deal with rights and that the right conferred on the 
em ployees at large was specifically withheld from certain probationers? Why, 
on the language o f  this agreement, is that not as valid as the reverse?29
In what must be considered the most significant paragraph of the 
Leeming decision Martland, J. states:
In my opinion, sections 91 and 92 o f  the Act do not purport to confer  
substantive rights upon employees in addition to their rights as defined in the 
Collective Agreement. T hey define the circumstances in which an employee 
who feels himself to be aggrieved may present his grievance at each level up  
to the final level in the grievance procedure (S. 91) and in which, after having 
presented his grievance up to that level, he may refer it to adjudication (s. 92). However, 
the grievance submitted must be determined in accordance with the provisions o f  
the Collective Agreem ent.24
T he emphasized words envision a right to the grievance process. By 
assuming the grievor is entitled to present his position, Martland J. has 
put the statutory right to adjudication ahead of the prohibitive provision 
in the collective agreement. It is clear from the emphasized words that 
M ardand J. intends that all employees, probationary, management or 
otherwise, are entitled to appear before an adjudicator.
T he adjudicators first task is to determine whether the employee is 
entitled to a hearing on the merits of the case. What determines the 
employee’s entitlement?
T he unionized employee will have his rights determined in accord­
ance with the Collective Agreement. The terms of the Agreement will 
dictate to the adjudicator whether he has the jurisdiction to hear the 
merits of the case.
T he rights of the non-unionized or management employee are to be 
found in the individual contract o f employment, itself subject to provi­
sions o f the Financial Administration Act (Sec. 6), and such other statutes 
as govern the setting of terms and working conditions in the public 
sector.
Confusion arises with the statement of M ardand J . “. . . and Article 
22.01 (e) enables the employer to terminate the employment of a pro­
13Supra, footnote 17, at 23-24.
**Supra, footnote 1, at 207.
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bationary employee without recourse to the grievance”.25 In light of his 
previous statement which confers precedence to the statute, article 22.01(e) 
should have been struck down as void unless the arbitrator determines 
that what the parties intended by Article 22.01(e) was that the employer 
need not show just cause to dismiss a probationary employee.
THE ANALYSIS
Labor law principles need not suffer greatly from the decision in Re 
Leeming. There is a dearth of appropriately applied precedent within the 
decision. O f the two cases considered, one was distinguished and dis­
missed. The more notable of the cases presented in the Respondent’s 
factum, Jacmain v. A.G. (Canada), was not considered by the court at all.
The brevity of the decision is a serious deficiency and has permitted 
the import of the case to be misconstrued. There are two steps to the 
grievance procedure, the first of which is the right to appear before an 
adjudicator. This right is provided by statute and is defined by the 
principal case as a procedural right. Therefore, by statute, everyone has 
a right to appear before an adjudicator. The second step is the grievor’s 
right to tell his story once he is before the adjudicator, that is, the right 
to a hearing on the merits o f the case and to a decision from the 
adjudicator. This right is defined by the instant court as a right that is 
governed by the collective agreement. The parties are free to bargain 
this right away if they wish. It is important to note that if an Agreement 
prohibits a probationary employee from grieving a discharge, it is not 
the Supreme Court in Leeming which removed the right. It is the Union 
and the Company at the bargaining table.
Re Leeming has been perceived in a rather negative light. The basic 
Canadian practice of third party arbitration and the ability to turn to a 
neutral third party affords a great protection in our system. Without 
such a right the employee can be subject to the very arbitrary decision 
of an employer, with no available remedy. At a time when expansion of 
access to a neutral third party is seen as a good thing, the Leeming 
decision has been interpreted by many to cut off that access.
A useful application of Re Leeming in argum ent is on the narrow 
aspect that it does in fact ensure the right to appear before a neutral 
adjudicator. A careful examination of the words o f Mardand J. reveals 
that regardless of the “procedural” label, he sees that grievance procedure 
as essential. The case can serve in this narrow perspective as well as in 
its currently prevalent role as a broad authority for denying rights to 
employees*.
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THE CONCLUSION
Re teem ing is authority for a statutory provision to grieve being a 
procedural right. Access to an adjudicator is available to all.
The adjudicator must then determine if the employee has a right to 
be heard on the merits o f the case. The Collective Agreement will govern 
these rights. If there is no prohibition, the union’s right to contract out 
of those rights will prevail. It may be possible to get around the prohib­
itive clause. As in Jacmain the wording may allow for distinction between 
rejection at the probationary stage and disciplinary dismissal. In the latter 
instance the adjudicator may retain jurisdiction to hear the merits. It 
may also be possible to argue that the wording is intended to prohibit 
only a grievance against probationary term ination, not wrongful dis­
missal.
There is a lesson in the Leeming case for employers who wish to 
terminate the employment of an unsatisfactory probationary employee. 
Basic rules of fairness require that an employee know why he is being 
discharged. An employer should give an explanation to the employee 
verbally and in writing outlining why the employee doesn’t meet the 
standard required by the job. An employee should have the opportunity 
to improve. An employer should defend his position before an adjudi­
cator if the adjudicator assumes jurisdiction to hear the merits; had this 
been done in Leeming, the case might never have gone beyond the 
grievance hearing.
The lesson for employees, on the other hand, is that they must be 
very aware of which o f their interests are being sacrificed in the Collective 
Agreement. Unions can’t contract out o f protection for probationary 
employees and still expect the probationary employee to be protected 
from another source.
As an interesting aside to this case, after Leeming the New Brunswick 
Treasury Board renegotiated with CUPE’s New Brunswick Council of 
School Board Employees, dropping from the Agreement the restrictive 
article about probationary employees.
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